Security and Integrity of Audience Measurement Data in TV 3.0

Abstract

Digital television systems are increasingly capable of collecting audience measurement data directly from receivers, enabling granular and context-aware telemetry. The Brazilian TV 3.0 platform introduces a middleware-managed Audience Measurement Manager (AMM) that automates this process through standardized session lifecycle, structured reporting, and trusted data delivery. Establishing trust in audience measurement reports is challenging because TV 3.0 receivers operate in a highly heterogeneous ecosystem and do not rely on user-account-based authentication mechanisms common in digital platforms. This paper investigates security and integrity aspects of audience measurement data collection in TV 3.0, focusing on three threats: data interception, bot-generated reports, and server overload. We examine cryptographic device attestation, using the Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) as a representative example, and propose a technology-neutral trust chain involving the receiver, a verifier, the manufacturer, and the broadcaster, designed to preserve viewer privacy by exposing only a report hash and minimal evidence to the verifier.